In this paper, we present an efficient proactive threshold RSA signature scheme for large-scale ad hoc networks. Our scheme has two advantages. Firstly, the building blocks of the whole scheme are proven secure. Secondly, the whole scheme is efficient.
Introduction
Proactive threshold signature is very important to tolerate a more powerful, mobile adversary [OY] [HJKM].Large-scale ad hoc networks have hundreds or even thousands of network nodes. Generally, all network nodes have shares of the secret key (private key), and only a small number of nodes could be corrupted. That is, n is very large and far larger than t. Most current proactive RSA schemes are not designed for this purpose [FGMYa] [FGMYb] [Rab] . To the best of our knowledge, the only proactive RSA scheme is URSA [LKZL] . Unfortunately, the scheme has proved faulty [JSY] .
In this paper, we present an efficient proactive threshold RSA signature scheme for large-scale ad hoc networks. Our scheme includes four protocols: the key distribution protocol, the signature generation protocol, the share refreshing protocol and the share distribution protocol. Our scheme has two advantages. Firstly, the building blocks of the whole scheme are proven secure. Secondly, the whole scheme is efficient. The efficiency of our scheme is approximate to that of the scheme of Wong et al.
In our scheme,an ad hoc network consists of P I , P2, . . . , P, nodes . There are two types of nodes: R (refreshing) nodes and S (signing) nodes. There are 2t + 1 R nodes, which perform the share refreshing protocol. All nodes are S nodes, which perform signing operations.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. The initial key distribution protocol, the share refreshing protocol, the share distribution protocol and the Input: secret key di E Z4(N),N,g,n,t, RIDList, PIDList [-nN2,nN2] 
Choose and hand Pi di ER
2. Compute and broadcast the witness wi = g d i m o d~ for i 6 RIDList .
3. Share the value di using the sharing 2,-VSS on input di, N,g,n,t, RIDList, Figure 1 . Initial key distribution signature generation protocol are presented in Section 1,2,3,4 respectively. In Section 5, some discussions are given.
Initial key distribution
The key distribution protocol is used to distribute the initial secret shares to 2t + 1 R nodes. Before distributing the secret key, we assume that a set-up process has been carried out in which the RSA key generation took place and the RSA key pair has been computed. an element g of high order is chosen as g = gt2 where go is an element of high order and L = n! . As shown in Figure 1 , the protocol consists of three steps. First, the private RSA key d is shared by generating additive secret shares disuch that d = dpUblic + C j dj . Then, the witnesses for the additive shares are generated in the second step. Finally, each additive share is backedup using a protocol 2,-VSS, which is depicted in Figure 2 . Here polynomial secret shares of the additive share are sent to 4t+2 nodes, of which 2t + 1 nodes are R nodes, the other nodes 2t + 1 are one-hop or two-hop neighbors. Note that not di , but diL3 is shared in 2,-VSS. After the initial key distribution protocol, every party achieves their polynomial shares of q l y = C f j ( i , 0 )
Joint-2,-VSS. For differentiation, we call dyly,di the polynomial secret share and the additive secret share, respectively. After the initial key distribution protocol, a group of 2t + 1 nodes within one-hop or two-hop distance hold the polynomial secret shares of the secret key. (RIDList, PIDList are R node ID list and node ID list of 2t + 1 nodes within one-hop or two-hop distance).
The details of 2,-VSS are shown in Figure 1 . 
Share refreshing
The essence of the share refreshing protocol is that each party splits his additive-share di into sub-shares dij which sum up to di , and gives each party Pj such a sub-share dij. The details are shown in Figure 3 , including seven steps. The message complexity and the communication complexity of protocol are 0(t3) and O ( t 5 k ) , respectively.
Share distribution
In the share distribution protocol, S nodes obtain their secret shares from their neighbors. First, those 2t + 1 nodes, which have been refreshed in the 
Signature generation
A signature share on a message m is generated as follows. Let H and be a hash function. The signature share of PI consists of xi = x4Ldy'V. Suppose we have valid shares from a set of I parties, where I = { P I , P2, ..., Pt+l).
Before combining shares, we define XiVj - Since e is a prime and larger than n, g c d ( 4~4 , e) = 1. Applying the extended Euclidean algorithm on e and 4~~ to compute a and b such that 4~~a + e b = 1 , then we achieve signature y = y'axb of the message m such that ye r xmodN . The message complexity and the communication complexity are O(t), O(tk) , respectively.
Discussions
The initial key distribution protocol is carried out at the onset of the system to distribute shares to 2t + 1 R nodes. The share refreshing protocol is carried out to update the old shares of 2t + 1 R nodes at the beginning of the every phase. After the initial key distribution or the share refreshing protocol, the share distribution protocol is performed to distribute secret shares to all other nodes. After nodes obtain their secret shares, they can employ these secret shares to perform signing using the signature generation protocol. As we point out in Section 1, the only proactive RSA scheme for large-scale ad hoc networks is the URSA scheme. However, URSA is insecure. Compared to URSA, our scheme is proven secure. Furthermore, the efficiency (the message complexity and the communication complexity) of our scheme is approximate to that of URSA. Due to space limitation, we only give some brief discussions. Both signature generation are based on polynomial secret shares, so the efficiency is similar. Our share distribution protocol is more efficient than that of URSA. The share refreshing protocol and the initial key distribution protocol of URSA are more efficient than ours.
